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Response to Susan Meld Shell
Geoffrey M. Vaughan

Jean-Jacques Rousseau marks one of the most important turning points in the
history of political thought. He was the last of the state of nature theorists and
the first of the moral as opposed to political philosophers; he was the inspira
tion for Romanticism as well as the two great philosophical system-builders
of the modern world, Kant and Hegel; his imagination marks him as one of
the greatest writers in the philosophical tradition, perhaps the last to merit
consideration for his prose. And, as Susan Shell explains in her chapter, no
other author so thoroughly explored what she calls the "primal natural senti
ment" of freedom as did Rousseau. My comments will attend to this particu
lar sentiment and to sentiments in general as a means of addressing the
themes of this project sponsored by the Agora Institute.

REASONING
Rousseau is one of those figures in the history of philosophy who divides
readers, and especially scholars, not only on what he wrote but on whether
his work really rises to the level of philosophy.1 According to some, his work
may be moving (or not) and contain arresting images, even be the basis for a
proper philosopher, such as Kant, but it does not count as philosophy. Any
one looking for a tight logical argument, constructed with the intention of
commanding assent from an attentive reader, will not find it in Rousseau's
work. As Shell quotes from Emile, "I am reminded that my business here is
not producing treatises on metaphysics and morals or courses of study of any
kind.... Others will perhaps demonstrate what I only indicate here."2 "Indi
cate" may be too much of an understatement, but this reticence to lay out an
argument is one of the strengths of his work.
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Rousseau's critique of argumentation arises from his concern, his obser
vation, of just how easily we can be diverted when thinking too much. Shell
draws our attention to an important distinction he drew in his Moral Letters
between reason and reasoning:
The art of reasoning is not reason at all; often it is its abuse. Reason [raison] is
the faculty of ordering all the faculties of our soul suitably to the nature of
things and their relations with us. Reasoning [raissonner] is the art of compar
ing known truths in order to compose from them other truths that one did not
know and which this art makes us discover.3

Reasoning, as described here, is the kind of philosophical argumentation that
begins with sound premises and moves to counterintuitive—we might dare to
say even unnatural—conclusions. Eric Voegelin, cited elsewhere in this vol
ume by Barry Cooper, seems to be making a similar point when he wrote:
"Truth is not a body of propositions about a world-immanent object; it i s the
world-transcendent summum bonum, experienced as an orienting force in t he
soul, about which we can speak only in analogical symbols."4 At the other
end of the spectrum, not only is reasoning less accessible than its practition
ers think; it can seem entirely disconnected from the lives of the rest of us.5
Moreover, although science and technology have proven to be a powerful
tool, reasoning does not always aim straight. The following paragraph in
Moral Letters confirms this:
In the chain of reasonings that serves to form a system the same proposition
will return a hundred times with almost insensible differences that will escape
the philosopher's mind. So often multiplied, these differences will finally
modify the proposition to the point of changing it completely without him
noticing it.

Subsequent reasoning by others merely takes one further and further away
from the initial insight and leads to the general confusion that is, as he notes,
the history of philosophy. A case in point would be Rousseau's legacy
which, as Shell notes,6 includes not only Kant, Hegel, and the Romantics, but
also Nietzsche, Rawls, and Habermas. This is hardly a unified school of
thought.
Indeed, one way to look at Rousseau's work is to see it as part caution and
part genealogy of how reason, history, and our own lives all conspire to
divert us from a sound development. The First and Second Discourses re
count our historical diversions from what we should have been. The Social
Contract and Emile try to show how things might be otherwise, both for a
society and an individual. In Emile, after describing the confusion between
physical and moral causes that is one of the greatest abuses committed by
contemporary philosophy, he continues: "Nature's instruction is late and
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slow; men's is almost always premature. In the former case the senses wake
the imagination; in the latter the imagination wakes the senses; it gives them
a precocious activity which cannot fail to enervate and weaken individuals
first and in the long run the species itself.""
How should we understand these two processes? First, it should be noted
that this distinction comes in the context of his reflections on the transition
between childhood and puberty. This is significant because Rousseau is one
of the few modern philosophers to give sustained attention to children and
childhood. 1 do not think this can be separated from his critique of reasoning.
The formation of children is not a straightforward process of reasoning. In
the immediate context we should consider how, in the natural order, the
senses will awaken the imagination rather than the other way around, but also
that it is imagination that is awakened, not reasoning.
Reasoning takes us both beyond ourselves and beyond our experiences. In
this way it is acquired and unnatural; we could say that reasoning is inauthentic. Reasoning is also unsettled and in constant motion, even or especially
when it does not have any right to be. Further on in the Moral Letters,
Rousseau writes: "Man's mind is in a condition to do a great deal but the
senses furnish him with few materials, and our soul, active in its bonds,
prefers to exert itself upon the chimeras that are within its reach than to
remain idle and without movement."8 Reasoning offers its false promise of
felicity by providing novelty, new things to distract the individual. There is
certainly an echo here of his criticisms of the sciences and the arts from the
First Discourse. We must, therefore, pay attention to the fact that he consid
ered reasoning an art and reason a faculty.
A clue to disentangling the distinction between reason and reasoning is
that the latter is not only an art, it i s an art of comparison. We might say it is
comparable to the notion of amour propre. Just as we compare ourselves to
others and develop new passions, so we compare truths to derive new ones.
Both processes take us out of ourselves and away from our fundamental
experience, what Rousseau calls the sentiment of existence.

SENTIMENT
Rousseau always began from and returned to sentiment. In so doing he raised
subjectivity to a new level of importance, even beyond that of Descartes. As
he wrote in the Moral Letters, "I have already told you, my design is not to
reason with you and it is from the depths of your heart that I want to draw the
only arguments that should convince you."9 In other words, he was avoiding
reasoning in favor of a different way to explain and convince. He was not
seeking to establish a correspondence between his ideas and the external
world, or even to speculate on how we might find such a correspondence. He
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was critical of the entire endeavor, as we hear again in the same work: "After
having proceeded through the narrow circle of their vain knowledge it is
necessary to end where Descartes had begun. I think therefore I exist. That is
all we know."10 In the face of such vanity one's sentiments are as certain as
anything else.
It is certainty that Rousseau was seeking, not the certainty of Descartes,
but a certainty that what he produced in Emile (or in a social contract) would
not degenerate. Degeneration was a constant fear animating his work. In
almost every case that he described, the initial stage is always the most pure,
the one he preferred, the one identified as "natural."11 (I am very much taken
with the way Shell chooses to use the word "native" at one point.) Later
stages lead away from that initial purity and will, without the kind of constant
vigilance described in both On the Social Contract and Emile, quickly degen
erate to a condition worse than the original. The converse of man's "perfect
ibility" is the tendency to become imperfect. Reason is not the solution
because it i s not as formative in this process as are the sentiments. Here is his
comment on Emile's discovery of Sophie:
On this passion, perhaps the only one he will feel intensely [vivement] in his
whole life, depends the final form his character is going to take. Once fixed by
a durable passion, his way of thinking [ses maniers de penser], his sentiments,
and his tastes are going to acquire a consistency which will no longer permit
them to deteriorate.12

With no prior imaginings, no indication of what it would be like to meet
Sophie and to experience the passions associated with this discovery, the
young man's sentiments are entirely natural, that is, they have retained their
original form and have not been corrupted. Accordingly, they are also strong
er and more durable than those that were awakened too soon and, as a result,
are disconnected from their true object.
Rousseau's project, then, would seem to be the recovery of an original
primitivism, and there are certainly strong indications that this is the case.
And yet, however much it might seem that way, the largest part of his work
never advocated an attempt to revert to the original conditions of mankind in
the state of nature. He praises, or rather prizes, those early moments for their
clarity rather than their features. Anachronistically, one might think of this as
a Heideggerian perspective.13 We could push it back a little further, a little
closer to Rousseau, and look at Nietzsche's Twilight of the Idols:
Socrates was a misunderstanding; any improvement morality, including Chris
tianity, is a misunderstanding. The most blinding daylight; rationality at any
price; life, bright, cold, cautious, conscious, without instinct, in opposition to
the instincts—all this was a kind of disease, merely a disease, and by no means
a return to "virtue," to "health," to happiness. To have to fight the instincts—

Response to Susan Meld Shell

143

that is the definition of decadence: as long as life is ascending, happiness
equals instinct.14

I do not want to turn this into a comparison of Rousseau and Nietzsche or
Rousseau and Heidegger. Nor can I more than point to Catherine Zuckert's
Postmodern Platos15 as a study of how some significant twentieth-century
philosophers did exactly this. Rather, I wish to emphasize that Rousseau's
return to nature was never a one-way journey. He was recovering possibil
ities, hoping to start our human story all over again or, as he put it in The
Second Discourse, present history as read in the book of nature.16
As Shell points out, Rousseau's rewriting of our history, history as it
ought to have been, does not convince even himself. And so instead he ended
his literary career with what Shell describes as an "alternative view," one in
which "the most 'natural' life—or the one that best rises to the challenge of
the human situation—lies not in moral virtue, or the reconsideration of soci
ety, but reflection and reverie undertaken in solitude."1 We can find its most
developed expression in Reveries of a Solitary Walker and his letters to
Malesherbes, but Shell also points to a remarkable intrusion of the idea in
Emile, which she describes as being "surprisingly Epicurean in tone."18 I
would suggest that his Epicureanism is neither out of place nor surprising;
rather, it is key to where he succeeds and, ultimately, fails.19
I c annot here develop the whole argument about Rousseau's debt to Epi
curus other than to point out that the sentiment of existence which so animat
ed his Reveries was a fundamental premise as early as the Second Discourse.
Civilized man, he explained, is at the mercy of others because "it is, so to
speak, from their judgment alone that he draws the sentiment of his own
existence."20 Moreover, and to paint with a very large brush, the sentiment of
existence is a good because it is pleasant. Pleasure, and especially the simple,
unadorned pleasures of amour de soi which Rousseau identified with natural
man are replaced by those we cannot control when, as amour propre, we
make the impossible demand that others love us more than themselves.21 His
project, which resulted in solitude, was to find a way to recover the original
pleasure of our natural sentiments in common with others.
As I have already claimed, the power of Rousseau's writing comes from
his direct appeal to sentiments rather than to reasoning. And I t hink it is no
mere coincidence that the influence and popularity of his works, in his day
and subsequently, corresponds to their ability to reflect sentiments we share
and know well. So, for instance, his identification and analysis of amour
propre is so arresting because it is so true to life. At the risk of identifying
one age as more bourgeois than another, our present world of social media is
perfectly captured by Allan Bloom's description of the one "who, when
dealing with others, thinks only of himself, and on the other hand, in his
understanding of himself, thinks only of others."22 From my experience
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introducing this idea to students, they get it. They love this part of Rousseau
because they feel it more than they understand it. What of the "alternative
view," that of the solitary walker? Even Rousseau had a hard time sharing
this experience. Perhaps a solitary experience, by definition, cannot be
shared. Or, in the words of Eric Voegelin, to attempt is "worse than futile: it
is the desecration of a mystery."23
The tone of Reveries of a Solitary Walker is notably less confident and
even a little apologetic. Here is the author relating one of his most important
experiences: "What then was this happiness, and in what did its enjoyment
consist? I shall let it be guessed at by all the men of this century, from the
description of the life which I led there."24 The author of the Discourses
would not have left so much to chance. Why must he do so? Here is another
passage from his reveries:
I rowed into the midst of the lake, when the water was calm; and there,
stretching myself out at full length in the boat, my eyes turned towards heaven,
I let myself go and wander about slowly at the will of the water, sometimes
during many hours, plunged into a thousand confused but delicious reveries,
which, without having any will-determined object, nor constancy, did not fail
to be in my opinion a hundred times preferable to all that I h ave found sweetest
in what are called the pleasures of life.25

How easy is it for us to share this experience? We might have felt something
like it, but few have found a moment like this to be "a hundred times prefer
able" to all other pleasures in life. The problem with Rousseau's account of
this "alternative view" is that he has become guilty of reasoning himself into
a conclusion that reason rejects. From his earlier perspective this, and any
thing produced by such reasoning, is as much as to quote without irony
Chico's line from Duck Soup (1933): "Who you gonna believe, me or your
own eyes?"
Chico's question is a great leveler. It deflates the pretensions of one who
claims to know more than another or of one who offers an argument someone
else cannot understand. As the most comical version of an argument from
authority, it also fits with Tocqueville's observation that "as citizens become
more equal and alike, the penchant of each to believe blindly a certain man or
class diminishes."26 The critique of reasoning that animates so much of
Rousseau's work prior to his Reveries can easily become, or at least sit
comfortably beside, democratic egalitarianism. This part of his work is par
ticularly suited to a democratic age, and it is no accident that among Rous
seau's legacies is what Shell calls an "unreservedly egalitarian orientation" in
contemporary moral theory.
Where does this leave the possibility, the alternative, of the solitary walk
er? Shell concludes her reflections with the tantalizing suggestion that Rous
seau's deepest thoughts present "an alternative philosophical trajectory, de-
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voted to a solitary quest for happiness through self-knowledge."2" It is in this
context that she introduces us to his distinction between reasoning and reason
that I have relied upon throughout, suggesting that self-knowledge is to be
found through the latter. Because I a gree with her regarding the importance
of the distinction and thank her for helping us to reflect upon it, I o ffer three
questions for further reflection.
First, it seems that for Rousseau to remain himself he cannot abandon the
place of sentiment for reason alone. To put it crudely, to replace Rousseau's
sentimentality with reason would make him too much like Kant. But if rea
son in his precise form must still attend closely to the sentiments, especially
to the sentiment of existence, how do the two relate? What comes to mind is
a phrase from one of his heirs. Would we be looking at a Rousseauian
version of Rawls' "reflective equilibrium"?
Second, if the mature Rousseau thought, in Shell's words, that the most
natural life "lies not in moral virtue, or the reconstitution of society, but
reflection and reverie undertaken in solitude," what is left to distinguish him
from Epicurus? The earlier Rousseau—the Rousseau of virtue as seen in The
Discourses, The Social Contract, and Em He—was the inspiration for
Jacques-Louis David as well as Kant and the other philosophers already
listed. This later Rousseau is the inspiration for Romanticism, a very differ
ent legacy. The interesting question, I think, is to what extent Rousseau the
solitary walker is a development from or break with Rousseau the citizen of
Geneva.
Finally, there is a great deal more to be said about the second half of
Rousseau's distinction between reasoning and reason, the half my remarks
have ignored completely. If his critique of reasoning [raisonner] is as signifi
cant as we both believe, what is this thing called reason [raison] and how
would it work differently to order "all the faculties of our soul suitably to the
nature of things and their relations with us"?
NOTES
1. See Matthew W. Maguire, "Rousseau and Pascal," in The Challenge of Rousseau, ed.
Eve Grace and Christopher Kelly (New York: Cambridge University Press. 2013), 194ff.
2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979),
235.
3. Shell in this volume, 134, quoted from Rousseau, Mora! Letters, in Rousseau on Philos
ophy, Morality, and Religion, ed. Christopher Kelly (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College Press,
2007), 80.
4. Eric Voegelin, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 16: Order and History, vol.
Ill: Plato and Aristotle, ed. Dante Germino (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999),
418. See also Randall S. Rosenberg's contribution to this volume where he cites Neil Ormerod
to the effect that Lonergan sought "something more than an argument, in the sense of conclu
sions drawn from premises" (217).
5. Plato's account of the philosopher returning to the Cave is the classic account of the
disconnect between philosophical insight and public incredulity (517a). A contemporary exam-
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pie would be scientific denials of the free will people experience every day. For a recent
refutation of these arguments, see Alfred R. Mele, Free: Why Science Hasn 7 Disproved Free
Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
6. Shell in this volume, 134-135.
7. Rousseau, Entile, 215.
8. Rousseau, Moral Letters, 84.
9. Ibid.. 89.
10. Ibid.. 87.
11. An instructive contrast can be found in a passage from Aristotle: "Now in these matters
as elsewhere it is by looking at how things develop naturally from the beginning that one may
best study them." Aristotle, The Politics, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1984). 1252a25 (35), quoted by James R. Stoner, Jr. in his contribution to this volume
(105).
12. Rousseau, Emile, 416.
13. See, for instance, Martin Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," in Early Greek
Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi
(San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1975), 27.
14. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, §11.
15. Catherine Zuckert, Postmodern Platos (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
16. Rousseau, The Second Discourse, ed. Roger Masters, 104. See also Rousseau, Emile,
416.
17. Shell, 134.
18. Ibid., 133.
19. Here I follow Frederick Vaughan, The Tradition of Political Hedonism from Hobbes to
J.S. Mill (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), 113—130.
20. Rousseau, Second Discourse, in The First and Second Discourses, ed. Roger D. Masters,
trans. Roger D. Masters and Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), 179.
21. Rousseau, Emile, 214.
22. Allan Bloom, "Introduction," in Rousseau, Emile, 5.
23. Voegelin, Collected Works, 73.
24. Rousseau, The Reveries of a Solitary, trans. John Gould Fletcher (New York: Burt
Franklin. 1971), 105-106.
25. Ibid., 109.
26. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans, and ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and
Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 409.
27. Shell, 135.
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